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What is the interrelationship among formal institutions, social networks, and new
venture growth? Drawing on the theory of institutional polycentrism and social net-
work theory, we examine this question using data on 637 entrepreneurs from four
different countries. We find the confluence of weak and inefficient formal institutions
to be associated with a larger number of structural holes in entrepreneurial social
networks. While the effect of this institutional order on the revenue growth of new
ventures is negative, a network’s structural holes have a positive effect on revenue
growth. Furthermore, the positive effect of structural holes on revenue growth is
stronger in an environment with a more adverse institutional order (i.e., weaker and
more inefficient institutions). The contributions and implications of these findings are
discussed.
Entrepreneurial ventures contribute to the eco-
nomic development of nations; therefore, under-
standing the influences on the creation and growth
of these ventures is of both theoretical and practical
importance (Baumol & Strom, 2007). We know
from extant research that entrepreneurs often cul-
tivate and use social networks to access resources
(e.g., capital, knowledge, supplies) that facilitate
new venture growth (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven,
1996; Granovetter, 1995; Kim & Aldrich, 2005;
Stam & Elfring, 2008; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007).
Prior research suggests that the use of social net-
works is influenced by institutional contexts (e.g.,
Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). Institu-
tions establish the rules of the game for entrepre-
neurial activities and thereby influence both the
nature and outcomes of entrepreneurs’ social net-
works (Baumol, 1990; Boettke & Coyne, 2009;
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer,
2002; Hwang & Powell, 2005; Owen-Smith & Pow-
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ell, 2008). The purpose of this research is to exam-
ine how formal institutions affect the development
and use of entrepreneurs’ social networks and new
venture growth. We employ the theory of institu-
tional polycentrism, which suggests that institu-
tions originate from multiple (poly) rule-setting
centers such as governments, associations, and
communities (Ostrom, 2010).
Although there has been a considerable amount
of research on the effects of specific institutions
(e.g., political risk) on particular managerial deci-
sions, institutions are complex and multifaceted
(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Louns-
bury, 2011; Kogut & Ragin, 2006) and their effects
on firm actions are interdependent (Delmas & Tof-
fel, 2008; Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas, & Svobo-
dina, 2004). The theory of institutional polycen-
trism postulates that institutional environments are
characterized by multiplicity, which is defined as
the confluence of different types of interrelated in-
stitutions (Ostrom, 2005a). The confluence of mul-
tiple institutions is theorized to have qualitatively
different effects on outcomes than a single institu-
tion or several institutions, because the confluence
is characterized by dynamic interaction, mutual
reinforcement, and a cointegrated and nonsepara-
ble nature of diverse institutional rules and norms
within the entire institutional order (Ostrom,
2005a, 2005b; Ostrom, Schroeder, & Wynne, 1993).
On the contrary, a single institution or several in-
stitutions may not affect entrepreneurial growth
directly, and therefore, are alone less relevant
for new ventures at early stages of development
(Tzeng, Beamish, & Chen, 2011). The confluence of
political, regulatory, and economic institutions af-
fects outcomes in interdependent and composite
manners partly because of their common historical,
geographic, and cultural foundations (Acemoglu,
Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; Amable, 2003; Greif &
Tabellini, 2010; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hall &
Thelen, 2009; Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador,
2013; Ostrom, 1986, 2005a, 2010; Sobel & Coyne,
2011). In contrast to previous research that mainly
explored the influence of a single institution or
regulatory, normative, and cognitive pillars of na-
tional institutions separately (Busenitz, Gomez, &
Spencer, 2000; Fogel, Hawk, Morck, & Yeung,
2006), this study examines the effects of the con-
fluence of multiple (political, regulatory, and eco-
nomic) institutions on entrepreneurs’ networks and
new venture growth. Figure 1 presents our theoret-
ical model.
The theory of institutional polycentrism further
suggests that the confluence of weak and inefficient
institutions motivates social actors to use their net-
works as substitutes for the lack of institutional
support, because loose-knit networks help them to
acquire resources from informal resource holders
who partially operate outside formal institutional
arrangements (Ostrom et al., 1993; Ostrom & Ahn,
2009; Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009).1 In
1 From the perspective of institutional polycentrism, a
weak institution involves one or more institutional rules
that are unable to achieve their intended goals and ob-
jectives (e.g., weak political and economic institutions),
whereas an inefficient institution is an interventionist
institution that increases the transaction costs of eco-
FIGURE 1
Model: Institutional Polycentrism, Network Structural Holes, and New Venture Growth
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this way, the confluence of weak and inefficient
institutions and social networks affects outcomes
including entrepreneurial growth in synergistic
ways (Ostrom, 2005b). Therefore, we focus on two
concepts of the theory of institutional polycentrism
to explain entrepreneurs’ networks and venture
growth: multiplicity of different types of institu-
tions (e.g., political, regulatory, and economic) and
institutional substitution. We posit that institu-
tional multiplicity characterizes the institutional
environment that exerts influence on entrepreneur-
ial networks and ventures, whereas institutional
substitution is a mechanism through which entre-
preneurs’ networks compensate for weak and inef-
ficient institutions, thus enhancing their effect on
new venture growth.
Extending the theory of institutional polycen-
trism and integrating it with social network theory,
we examine the following four questions: (a) Does
the confluence of weak and inefficient political,
regulatory, and economic institutions affect the de-
velopment of a network’s structural holes (the ab-
sence of a link between two contacts who are both
linked to an actor)? (b) Does the confluence of weak
and inefficient political, regulatory, and economic
institutions affect new venture growth? (c) Do
structural holes in entrepreneurs’ networks affect
new venture growth? (d) Does the confluence of
weak and inefficient political, regulatory, and eco-
nomic institutions moderate the relationship be-
tween network’s structural holes and new venture
growth? We explore these questions using struc-
tured interview data from 637 new venture firms
founded in one of four nations (China, France, Rus-
sia, and the United States) that display varying and
unique institutional orders (World Bank, 2010).
A number of contributions flow from this re-
search. First, by employing the relatively new con-
cepts institutional multiplicity and institutional
substitution to explain entrepreneurs’ networks
and growth of new ventures, we integrate and sys-
tematize disparate ideas on polycentric institutions
to develop a cohesive theory of institutional
polycentrism, which represents a contribution to
institutional theory and research. Second, this
study contributes to institution-based comparative
research on entrepreneurship, further contributing
to understanding of new venture growth by using
an integrated perspective on institutional polycen-
trism and social networks (Cumming, Sapienza,
Siegel, & Wright, 2009; Lerner & Schoar, 2010). As
a third contribution, our study “opens the door” to
the possibilities associated with studying entrepre-
neurship within an informal economy context
characterized by illegality yet legitimacy (Webb et
al., 2009). Finally, structural holes in entrepre-
neurs’ networks enable them to access informal
resource holders and their resources when the for-
mal institutional order is adverse for entrepreneurs.
As such, this research provides a contribution to
knowledge on the contingent value of networks and
how entrepreneurs manage network resources
(Brass et al., 2004; Burt, 1992; Xiao & Tsui, 2007).
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND
HYPOTHESES
Institutional Polycentrism Theory
The notion of polycentricity refers to a spontane-
ous order in which multiple and independent de-
cision-making centers and actors make mutual ad-
justments for ordering their relations within a
general framework of rules and norms (Ostrom,
1999a, 1999b; Polanyi, 1951). In this sense, poly-
centricity is the extent to which the adjustment of
each actor in the order is related in a certain man-
ner to the adjustment of every one of these actors to
each of the others. The totality of these spontane-
ous interactions and adjustments represents a
polycentric order (Aligica & Tarko, 2012).
The concept of institutional polycentricity de-
notes spontaneous interactions of multiple institu-
tional rules and norms, and mutual adjustments
among institutional actors. Social actors, including
organizations and individuals, pursue their goals in
polycentric institutional settings where they com-
ply with multiple governance rules at different
levels and scales embedded in local knowledge and
particular settings (Ostrom, 1990). Therefore,
polycentric institutional order is a complex system
of governance in which authorities from overlap-
ping jurisdictions (or “centers” of authority) inter-
act to determine the conditions and constraints
under which units of governance, such as organi-
zations and individuals, act legitimately (McGin-
nis, 2011).
Institutional polycentrism theory defines
polycentric institutions as multiple, configura-
tional, and context-specific institutional rules and
norms that originate from, are situated in, and are
enforced by numerous decision-making power cen-
nomic activities (e.g., inefficient regulatory institutions)
(Ostrom et al., 1993; Shleifer, 2005).
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ters. Therefore, polycentric institutional order is a
self-coordinating spontaneous system that results
from the interplay of multiple, complex, recom-
bined, and particular context-embedded rules and
norms, and the interchanges among numerous in-
terdependent institutional actors (Hayek, 1973;
Ostrom, 1999a; Polanyi, 1951). Thus, the main the-
oretical postulates of institutional polycentrism are
institutional multiplicity, institutional configura-
tion, and institutional context specificity (Greif,
2006; Hall & Thelen, 2009; Ostrom, 1986,
2005a, 2010).
In this study, we examine the roles of institu-
tional multiplicity and institutional substitution,
two key dimensions of institutional polycentrism,
in the development of entrepreneurs’ networks and
venture growth. Institutional multiplicity as a con-
fluence of institutions is defined as dynamic inter-
play, mutual reinforcement, and cointegration of
diverse rules and norms in which the effect of
change in one rule and norm or a set of rules and
norms is contingent upon other rules and norms in
use (Ostrom, 2011). Institutional substitution is a
process in which weak (e.g., nonenforced) and in-
efficient rules lead to the rise of alternative sets of
rules, norms, and networks that compensate for
their lack of influence and usefulness (Crouch,
2005; Hall & Soskice, 2001; North, 1990, 2005; Os-
trom et al., 1993). Thus, substitution is a process in
which one set of formal institutions and informal
networks is used to replace or overcome the debil-
itating effects of multiple weak and inefficient in-
stitutions (Deeg, 2005; Hall & Soskice, 2001).
Confluence of Weak and Inefficient Institutions
and Networks’ Structural Holes
The combination of weak and inefficient nation-
al-level institutions enhances the importance of in-
formal norms and networks (Holmes et al., 2013;
Ostrom, 2005a, 2005b). When national institutions
are weak and inefficient, many formal and informal
institutions must be considered by managers, and
such a context generates uncertainty and ambiguity
as to which is the most relevant institution or set of
institutions for a given situation (Heberer, 2003).
The authority for rule making and enforcement be-
comes more diffused and sometimes difficult to
identify. These conditions create special challenges
for entrepreneurs with new ventures, who need to
identify what is needed to achieve legitimacy and
to access resources for survival and growth. How-
ever, when national formal institutions are stronger
and more efficient, they often take precedence over
other lower-level institutions and are more likely to
be congruent with informal institutions (e.g., social
norms), thereby creating an environment of lower
uncertainty and ambiguity (Holmes et al., 2013).
The confluence of multiple weak and inefficient
institutions creates an institutional order in which
negative change in one rule or sets of rules triggers
negative changes in other rules in use, because of
the cointegrated and interdependent nature of in-
stitutions (Ostrom, 2005a; Sobel & Coyne, 2011).
This catalytic process results in negative reinforce-
ment among the institutions (Schneider & Karcher,
2010; Wilson & Herzberg, 2000), increased conflicts
among various institutions (Hancke, 2010; Pache &
Santos, 2010; Seo & Creed, 2002), and institutional
deterioration, leading weak and inefficient institu-
tions to become even weaker and more inefficient
(Acemoglu et al., 2005; North & Shirley, 2008).
These destructive interdependent processes make
the entire institutional order adverse for entrepre-
neurs, motivating them to build diverse networks
rich in structural holes as informal substitute chan-
nels for resource acquisition (Batjargal, 2006;
Kharkhordin & Gerber, 1994; Sedaitis, 1998; Webb
et al., 2009).
Networks rich in structural holes facilitate ven-
ture growth because entrepreneurs use them to gain
access to nonredundant information and resources
and to obtain social support (Batjargal, 2007a; Burt,
1992; Stam & Elfring, 2008). Additionally, the pos-
itive effect of a network’s structural holes on ven-
ture growth is stronger when the confluence of
weak and inefficient institutions creates an adverse
institutional order, forcing entrepreneurs to reach out
to informal resource holders who operate largely be-
yond their formal institutional arrangements (Nee,
2005; Ostrom, 2005b; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009).
Each type of weak and inefficient institution gen-
erates forms of institutional uncertainty and ambi-
guity, such as uncertainty regarding access to finan-
cial resources or as to ability to transact efficiently
(Feldmann, 2007; Sobel, Clark, & Lee, 2007). How-
ever, when one set of institutions is weak, but
other, relatively strong institutions exist, social ac-
tors rely on the stronger institutions to mitigate the
negative consequences of the dysfunctional ones
(Herrmann, 2008). For example, when labor market
institutions are weak but government employment
policies are relatively strong, then these policies
offset the negative externalities of the dysfunc-
tional labor market institutions (Wulfgramm,
2011). In this way, the negative implications of one
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type of weak and inefficient institution are less
detrimental for entrepreneurs if there are other
stronger and more efficient institutions that com-
pensate for the deficiencies (Heberer, 2003). How-
ever, when there is a confluence of different types
of weak and inefficient formal institutions, the neg-
ative synergy makes the entire formal institutional
environment highly uncertain for entrepreneurs,
because there is little or no formal institutional
support of which they can be assured (Boettke,
Coyne, & Leeson, 2008; Fogel et al., 2006; Ovaska &
Sobel, 2005; Wilson & Herzberg, 2000). The cumu-
lative effects of the negative synergy among weak
and inefficient institutions increase the strategic
value of diverse entrepreneurial networks (Batjar-
gal, 2000, 2003a, 2007a; Heberer, 2003; Sedaitis,
1998; Xin & Pearce, 1996).
Political institutional systems that lack demo-
cratic checks and balances tend to be weak and
unstable, resulting in distrust among social actors,
including entrepreneurs in such institutions (Lede-
neva, 1998). These political institutions often dis-
advantage those groups that are not members of the
ruling political parties and clans (Tsai, 2007). The
mistrust of public institutions results in the devel-
opment of diverse private networks that serve as
alternative channels for information exchange, re-
sources, and social support (Tsai, 2002). The real
and perceived institutional discrimination moti-
vates entrepreneurs to build nonredundant net-
works as safety nets (Batjargal, 2003b; Ostrom,
2005a). The concentration of political power in the
executive branches of government leaves judicial
authorities weak (Shleifer, 2005). These conditions
increase transaction costs for entrepreneurs, caus-
ing them to use private channels (e.g., trusted in-
termediaries) through which they can complete im-
portant transactions (McMillan & Woodruff, 1999).
Weak economic institutions (e.g., institutions re-
sponsible for capital availability and market liquid-
ity) directly and indirectly influence entrepre-
neurs’ network structures (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006;
Batjargal, 2006). For example, a shortage of loans
and investment funds for start-up ventures moti-
vates entrepreneurs to search for financial re-
sources from diverse sources such as business an-
gels, neighborhood credit associations, and other
informal financial networks (McMillan & Wood-
ruff, 1999; Tsai, 2002). Further, money-market illi-
quidity and inflexible exchange rates disadvantage
new ventures disproportionately. Therefore, entre-
preneurs mobilize bridging ties in their networks to
overcome these difficulties generated by weak eco-
nomic institutions (Batjargal, 2005; Stam & El-
fring, 2008).
Interventionist regulatory institutions (e.g.,
overly bureaucratic registration procedures) pro-
duce a great deal of institutional inefficiencies that
increase entrepreneurs’ transaction and opportu-
nity costs (Ardagna & Lusardi, 2010; Ostrom,
2005b; World Bank, 2010). These inefficiencies
force entrepreneurs to employ particular network-
based strategies (e.g., relational contracting) to re-
duce transaction costs (McMillan & Woodruff,
1999). Networks rich in structural holes enable en-
trepreneurs to obtain permissions, licenses, and
quotas and to re-enforce contracts and curb the
predatory prerogatives of the government, because
these ties serve as bridges to valuable contacts in
distant social clusters (Batjargal, 2003a, 2003b;
Frye, 2000; Frye & Shleifer, 1997).
The confluence of weak and inefficient political,
economic, and regulatory rules heightens the value
of diverse and loose-knit networks through several
mechanisms, such as the dynamics associated with
negative mutual reinforcement and synergy
(Schneider & Karcher, 2010; Wilson & Herzberg,
2000), increased institutional conflicts and contra-
dictions (Hancke, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2010; Seo
& Creed, 2002), and institutional deterioration and
reversals (Acemoglu et al., 2005; North & Shirley,
2008). The distrust in political institutions en-
hances entrepreneurs’ reliance on network-based
strategies and tactics that are used to cope with
weak economic institutions and inefficient regula-
tions (Spicer & Pyle, 2002). The chronic financial
disadvantages generated by inferior economic insti-
tutions justify and perpetuate obtaining financial
and other tangible resources from network ties,
which are often cultivated for purposes of circum-
venting intrusive regulatory institutions (Malesky
& Taussig, 2009; World Bank, 2010). Weak legal
protections through court systems together with
predatory inclinations of government bureaucra-
cies often make informal channels of protection the
primary and perhaps the only alternative available
to entrepreneurs (Volkov, 2002). The legal and ad-
ministrative restrictions on business activities—in
combination with frequent shortages of cash, for-
eign currency, and supplies—compel entrepre-
neurs to rely to a greater degree on loose-knit per-
sonal networks (Tsai, 2002).
The combination of weak and inefficient institu-
tions serves as a catalyst for conflicts within an
institutional system (Hancke, 2010). For example,
burdensome regulations clash with market-based
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economic institutions that require relative freedom
and strong legal foundations to operate effectively
(Bjornskov & Foss, 2008; Nee, 2005; North & Shir-
ley, 2008). Inefficient (often contradictory) regula-
tions exacerbate institutional confusion and im-
pose competing demands on organizations that can
be especially challenging for new firms (Pache &
Santos, 2010). Amalgamated weak and inefficient
institutions often lack conflict resolution mecha-
nisms, thereby potentially escalating disputes
among different actors (Ostrom, 2005a). The series
of weak and inefficient institutions often results in
institutional deterioration that increases the risk for
entrepreneurs in the institutional context (Acemo-
glu et al., 2005; North & Shirley, 2008). Frequent
policy reversals precipitate constant rule changes
that amplify institutional uncertainty.
Thus, negative synergy, institutional conflicts,
and institutional deterioration generate risky and
adverse institutional environments for entrepre-
neurs (Guseva & Rona-Tas, 2001; North, 1990;
World Bank, 2010). As a result, entrepreneurs are
forced to cultivate networks rich in structural holes
to cope with such adversity and to access resources
(North, 1990). These negative institutional pro-
cesses heighten the value and utility of entrepre-
neurial networks rich in structural holes (Ostrom,
1990, 2005b); entrepreneurs use networks as sub-
stitutes for weak and inefficient formal institutions.
These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The confluence of weak and in-
efficient institutions has a positive effect on
entrepreneurial networks’ structural holes (i.e.,
entrepreneurs’ networks have more structural
holes).
Confluence of Weak and Inefficient Institutions
and New Venture Growth
A single weak or inefficient institution can ad-
versely influence the revenue growth of young
firms (Frye & Shleifer, 1997). However, the combi-
nation of multiple weak and inefficient institutions
has a strong, cumulative, negative effect on revenue
growth, because these institutions reinforce one an-
other’s harmful effects (Schneider & Karcher, 2010;
Wilson & Herzberg, 2000), impose contradictory
demands on new firms (Pache & Santos, 2010), and
tend to be unstable (North & Shirley, 2008; Sobel &
Coyne, 2011). The negative influences of weak and
diffuse institutions increase the challenges of iden-
tifying growth opportunities, create higher transac-
tion costs, and constrain access to resources. The
confluence of these institutions makes it difficult to
develop effective sales and marketing strategies,
especially for new venture firms. These problems
are reflected in lower revenue growth (Boettke et
al., 2008; Fogel et al., 2006; Ostrom, 2005a; Ovaska
& Sobel, 2005).
Weak political institutions often impose restric-
tions on social activities that in turn hinder entre-
preneurial opportunity identification and innova-
tion (Batjargal, 2007a; Tsai, 2007). Weak political
institutions and bureaucratic regulatory controls
tend to foster corruption and bribery that hinder
entrepreneurs’ risk taking (Tonoyan, Strohmeyer,
Habib, & Perlitz, 2010). Under these conditions,
new ventures are less likely to grow.
Inefficient regulatory (including legal) institu-
tions often result in insecure property and contrac-
tual rights, which negatively influences both
growth incentives and intentions, because entre-
preneurs are unsure of their ability to obtain and
retain adequate returns from a venture’s strategic
actions (e.g., introduction of new product) (Bau-
mol, 1990; Desai, Gompers, & Lerner, 2005; Frye &
Shleifer, 1997). The overly bureaucratic rules redi-
rect entrepreneurs’ attention, time, and energies
away from revenue generation activities and
thereby increase overall opportunity costs (World
Bank, 2010).
Weak economic institutions are especially harm-
ful to young firms because they constrain entrepre-
neurs’ access to equity and debt capital (Batjargal &
Liu, 2004; Malesky & Taussig, 2009). The limited
supply of funds for capital investment reduces op-
erating working capital available for production
and services, thereby restricting revenue growth
(LeLarge, Sraer, & Thesmar, 2010). Similarly, a
shortage of or restrictions on the use of foreign
currency hampers new ventures’ ability to import
new technologies, product components, and raw
materials and to sell their products in overseas
markets (Tsai, 2002). The combination of weak and
inefficient institutions results in negative synergy
because of destructive mutual reinforcement and
increased institutional contradictions and reversals
that disrupt venture growth processes and trajecto-
ries (North & Shirley, 2008). Drawing on these ar-
guments, we propose:
Hypothesis 2. The confluence of weak and in-
efficient institutions has a negative effect on
the revenue growth of new ventures.
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Networks’ Structural Holes and New Venture
Growth
As an alternative channel for resource acquisi-
tion, a network’s structural holes enable entrepre-
neurs to access informal resource holders who par-
tially operate beyond formal institutional
arrangements (e.g., overseas informal investors)
(Batjargal, 2007a; Burt, 1992). In contrast, dense
networks with fewer structural holes connect en-
trepreneurs with local resource holders who often
operate within a shared institutional order (Gra-
novetter, 1995). Entrepreneurial networks rich in
structural holes facilitate a new venture’s revenue
growth through six mechanisms: access to nonre-
dundant information, knowledge, and referrals;
brokerage; access to tangible resources; structural
autonomy; social and emotional support; and the
transitivity mechanism (Burt, 1992; Granovetter,
1973, 1995; Stam & Elfring, 2008; Stuart & Soren-
son, 2007).
Loose-knit and diverse networks rich in struc-
tural holes enable entrepreneurs to obtain nonre-
dundant private information about sales opportu-
nities (e.g., information about new market segments
for existing products, new products for current cli-
ents, and new distribution channels in a timely
fashion), because these networks serve as bridging
ties to distant clients (Batjargal, 2010a; Stam & El-
fring, 2008; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). The sales
referrals and recommendations from trusted ties
generate higher revenues, and interpersonal trust
and expectations between entrepreneurs and refer-
ees are likely to transfer to third parties (e.g.,
new clients) (Castilla, Hwang, Granovetter, & Gra-
novetter, 2000). Such relational trust lubricates and
speeds up the sales processes of customization,
pricing, delivery, and after-sales services (Uzzi,
1997).
Brokerage is a process by which intermediary
actors facilitate transactions between other actors
lacking access to or trust in one another. The bro-
kers generate returns each time they broker an ex-
change (Marsden, 1982). Entrepreneurs can benefit
in these cases by serving as intermediaries between
potential suppliers and customers from distant net-
work clusters (Burt, 1992).
The bridging ties to different social clusters en-
hance entrepreneurs’ access to diverse tangible re-
sources (Batjargal, 2010b; Stam & Elfring, 2008).
Having access to a broader set of resources in-
creases the probability that entrepreneurs will have
access to the type and amount of resources needed
at any given time. The increased flows of money,
materials, and technologies enable entrepreneurs to
formulate and execute more aggressive sales and
marketing strategies that stabilize or enhance reve-
nue streams and make income growth sustainable
over the long term (Batjargal & Liu, 2004).
An important but sometimes overlooked mecha-
nism through which structural holes generate ben-
efits is the relative structural autonomy that low-
density networks generate. Entrepreneurs who rely
on disconnected network clusters are less depen-
dent on a few powerful network members (e.g.,
suppliers and customers), who might attempt to
exercise control over the entrepreneurs. Structural
independence gives entrepreneurs freedom to act
on revenue opportunities without compromising
their sources of resources and support (Burt, 1992).
Structural holes can also provide potential socio-
emotional benefits to entrepreneurs from diverse
ties. The different people who populate entrepre-
neurs’ networks, such as mentors, friends, and fam-
ily members, each satisfy different socioemotional
needs of entrepreneurs (Carsrud, Gaglio, & Olm,
1987). While mentors provide encouragement for
business achievements, friends and family help en-
trepreneurs to cope with work-related stress and
the competitive pressures endemic to entrepre-
neurial ventures. Importantly, disconnected sup-
port networks make it less likely that social prob-
lems and the challenges they generate would
migrate from work to families and from families to
work. In this sense, loose-knit networks serve as a
buffer or protection for entrepreneurs. This situa-
tion promotes enhanced confidence, commitment,
and psychic resources on the part of the entrepre-
neurs, thereby better enabling them to concentrate
on revenue generation activities (Krueger & Dick-
son, 1994).
The last mechanism that facilitates revenue
growth is transitivity of network triads. When an
entrepreneur connects and integrates two trusted
contacts from distant network clusters, positive
outcomes, such as the integration of different
knowledge stocks and resources, access to venture
capital, and alliance creation, can occur (Batjargal,
2007b; Granovetter, 1973). These outcomes have
the potential to contribute to higher revenue
growth in entrepreneurial ventures. For example,
the combination of different knowledge stocks
and/or other resources potentially allows firms to
identify and exploit new market opportunities.
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Summarizing these arguments, we propose:
Hypothesis 3. Entrepreneurial networks’ struc-
tural holes have a positive effect on the reve-
nue growth of new ventures.
The Moderating Role of the Confluence of Weak
and Inefficient Institutions
The effects of an entrepreneurial network’s struc-
tural holes on revenue growth are greater when the
confluence of weak and inefficient institutions cre-
ates an adverse institutional order with which en-
trepreneurs must cope. More specifically, we ex-
pect that networks rich in structural holes serve as
substitutions for weak and inefficient formal insti-
tutions helping entrepreneurs to access informal
resource holders who partially operate beyond for-
mal institutional arrangements (Deeg, 2005; Nee,
2005; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). Resources accessed
from these sources are generally helpful, but they
have greater importance and are critical to enhanc-
ing venture growth when formal institutions are
weak and inefficient.
Institutional environment represents an impor-
tant component of the context within which new
venture firms must operate and seek growth. While
a single weak institution or several inefficient in-
stitutions may have small or negligible effects on
entrepreneurial growth (Tzeng et al., 2011), the
confluence of multiple weak and inefficient insti-
tutions creates a hostile institutional context for
entrepreneurs due to negative synergy among the
various institutions (e.g., negative reinforcement,
and institutional conflicts and deterioration)
(Volkov, 2002). The adverse institutional order re-
sults in more challenging opportunity identifica-
tion, high transaction costs, constrained access to
resources, and inadequate sales strategies. Under
these conditions, entrepreneurs need to mobilize
their personal networks as alternative channels to
increase revenues, because the formal institutional
support available is deficient (Boettke et al., 2008;
Heberer, 2003). The diverse networks rich in struc-
tural holes substitute for the functions generally
provided by institutions and thereby enable entre-
preneurs to recognize new revenue opportunities
efficiently (e.g., cost effectively), reduce transaction
and opportunity costs, access financial and mate-
rial resources from informal channels, and support
their actions to formulate and execute sales-market-
ing strategies (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2008;
Aoki, 1994; Batjargal, 2010a; Granovetter, 1995;
Tsai, 2002; Webb, Kistruck, Ireland, & Ketchen,
2010). Thus, personal networks compensate for the
deficiencies of multiple weak and inefficient insti-
tutions. As a result, the networks become even
more important in the context of an adverse insti-
tutional order, and thus, entrepreneurs depend
more heavily on them under these conditions.
Networks supplement or supplant weak and in-
efficient rules and prescriptions when the goals,
intentions, and expectations of formal institutional
actors and entrepreneurs are incompatible and con-
flicting (Estrin & Prevezer, 2011). One pervasive
outcome of weak and inefficient institutions is ram-
pant corruption, in which formal institutional ac-
tors (rule makers and enforcers) become personal
rent seekers (Baumol, 1990; Boettke et al., 2008).
And, when formal institutions are antagonistic, a
reliable protection is trusted social relationships
(Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). Diverse network ties can be
used for protection when the intentions and behav-
iors of multiple institutional actors and entrepre-
neurs are hostile (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). For
example, by mobilizing members of their dispersed
networks, entrepreneurs may be able to avoid pay-
ing illegal fees and bribes and to secure their prop-
erty (Batjargal, 2003b; Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou,
2008; Volkov, 2002). The transaction costs of using
ties as protection can sometimes be high, but the
costs are lower than acquiescing to corruption. And
these ties will allow entrepreneurs to enhance their
venture’s growth while simultaneously avoiding
the costs emanating from corrupt practices.
Thus, the combination of weak and inefficient
institutions leads to greater returns from networks
for entrepreneurs. In other words, this type of in-
stitutional environment enhances the importance
of and the value created from entrepreneurial net-
works. Specifically, the confluence of weak and
inefficient institutional rules enhances the positive
effects of a network’s structural holes on the reve-
nue growth of new ventures. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4. The confluence of weak and in-
efficient institutions positively moderates the
effect of networks’ structural holes on revenue
growth of new ventures. The positive relation-
ship between structural holes and revenue
growth is stronger in a more adverse institu-
tional order due to the confluence of weak and
inefficient institutions.
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METHODS
Country Institutional Polycentricity
We chose China, Russia, France, and the United
States as country contexts for this study for the
following reasons. First, the four nations indicate
varying confluences of different political, regula-
tory, and economic institutions for entrepreneur-
ship (World Bank, 2010). China combines commu-
nist political institutions, a mixed legal system of
communist and German laws, and hybrid eco-
nomic institutions of state, collective, and private
ownership. In contrast, Russia blends a semidemo-
cratic political institution, a formerly socialist ju-
dicial structure, and a transitioning overregulated
market economy. The French institutional system
is comprised of a European political institution
with a powerful presidency, a civil law tradition,
and a coordinated market economy. The United
States has a liberal presidential political institu-
tion, a common law system, and a liberal market
economy.
Second, the institutional order in each country
represents a unique configuration of institutions, in
which each type of institution has a different
weight and influence within the whole system. For
example, political institutions have relative domi-
nance over other types of institutions in China
(Nee, 2005; Xu, 2011), whereas in Russia, the bu-
reaucratic regulatory institutions have a great deal
of influence on economic and social institutions
(Shleifer, 2005). In contrast, social welfare institu-
tions carry strong weight within the French na-
tional system, and market-based economic institu-
tions exert strong influence on political and
regulatory institutions in the United States.
Third, the evolutionary trajectories of multiple
institutions in each country differ. For example, in
China, while political institutions preserve the sta-
tus quo, private property–based market institutions
are growing strong. In Russia, there is an increasing
gap between predatory bureaucracies and private
property–based institutions (Batjargal, 2007c). The
social welfare system in France is expanding,
thereby placing increasing pressure on financial
institutions. In the United States, a tenuous balance
between political, regulatory, and economic insti-
tutions is maintained via the country’s legal system
and mature institutions. Thus, the different institu-
tional confluence, configuration, and evolutionary
trajectories in these countries provide useful set-
tings in which to test the theoretical ideas based on
institutional polycentricity.
Sample, Procedure, and Survey Data
We conducted structured telephone interviews
with 205 Chinese, 105 French, 172 Russian, and
155 US entrepreneurs. The Chinese and Russian
data were collected in the summer and fall of 2005;
the American data were collected in the winter of
2006 and spring of 2007; and the French data were
collected in the winter and spring of 2007.
A particular challenge in international entrepre-
neurship research is to achieve methodological and
sampling equivalence across international contexts
(Cumming et al., 2009). We adopted the following
seven sampling criteria and procedures. First, we
identified entrepreneurs in each country and city
using various information sources.2 In the United
States, entrepreneurs were identified through the
Dun & Bradstreet database and through minority-
and women-based business directories in Texas
and Arizona. In Russia and China, there is no
equivalent of Dun & Bradstreet. Therefore, our sam-
ple was derived from a number of data sources:
government-created databases, telephone directo-
ries, and specialized business directories in Beijing
and Moscow. In France, we identified entrepre-
neurs from entrepreneurs’ associations (e.g., Centre
des Jeunes Dirigeants and Club des Entrepreneurs)
and leading business school alumni directories.3
Although the use of various information sources
makes sampling less systematic, this approach en-
abled us to identify more and diverse ventures and,
arguably, made the sample more random because
various databases and directories are likely to
counterbalance one another’s biases.4 Second, we
2 The complete list of all information sources in Chi-
nese, Russian, French, and English is available upon
request.
3 Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants and Club des Entrepre-
neurs are two of the largest and most active entrepreneur-
ial associations in France, and they operate mostly in
large cities such as Paris.
4 The usage of many different information sources for
identification of sample populations of new ventures is
necessary in emerging economies for the following rea-
sons. First, in China and Russia there are no complete,
systematic, and well-established databases of new ven-
tures. If there are some, access to them is limited for
scholars—in particular, for those scholars based in the
West. Therefore, researchers are forced to use only pub-
licly available information sources. Second, in the
emerging economies, certain types of enterprise data-
bases, company directories, and membership lists of as-
sociations are likely to be biased in some dimensions,
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oversampled women entrepreneurs in each coun-
try, because they are fewer than men entrepreneurs
around the world (Langowitz & Minniti, 2007).
Third, we tried to avoid sampling low-growth-in-
tention “life-style” start-ups, self-employed sole
entrepreneurs, and necessity-based, survival-type
ventures, particularly in the emerging economies of
China and Russia (Langowitz & Minniti, 2007).
Therefore, we interviewed entrepreneurs in large
metropolitan areas including Beijing, Moscow,
Houston, Phoenix, and Paris. Fourth, a firm had to
be eight years old or younger, in line with previous
research on new ventures (Zahra, 1996). Fifth, the
firm could not be a franchise, subsidiary, or spin-
off of an established organization (to ensure that the
venture has true financial and managerial indepen-
dence). Sixth, each new venture had to be domes-
tically owned (i.e., with no foreign stake in the
venture). Seventh, each respondent had to be a
majority owner of and have a decision-making role
in the firm (e.g., CEO).
In China, 817 ventures met our sampling criteria.
We successfully contacted 513 firms but could not
reach the remaining 304 ventures. The response
rate was 40 percent in China (205 firms responded).
In Russia, 652 ventures met the sampling criteria.
We were able to contact 507 firms but could not
reach the remaining 145 firms. The response rate
was 30 percent in Russia (172 firms). The response
rates in France and the United States were 37 per-
cent (105 firms) and 30 percent (155 firms), respec-
tively. The overall response rate of 35 percent (637
responded out of 1,820 contacted) compares favor-
ably with most network surveys (Marsden, 1990).
More than 80 percent of entrepreneurs stated that
high growth is the most important goal. This result
confirms that the majority of the ventures were
high-growth-intention start-ups.
Trained interviewers conducted telephone inter-
views using a specially designed questionnaire.
The survey instrument was first developed in Eng-
lish and then translated into Chinese, Russian, and
French. We employed back translation to ensure
equivalence in the survey questions across the four
countries. As this is a cross-level study, we col-
lected institutional data at the country level, social
network data at the individual level, and venture
growth data at the firm level (Hitt, Beamish, Jack-
son, & Mathieu, 2007).
Measures
Independent variables. In this study, we used
the strength-weakness composite institutional vari-
able to capture the confluence of weak and ineffi-
cient political, regulatory, and economic institu-
tions at the national level. The partial least squares
(PLS) analytical tool provided differential weights
for each component within the composite (latent)
variable. We focused on national institutions be-
cause they provide a general framework within
which subnational institutions are nested and em-
bedded (Ostrom, 2005a). Data on formal institu-
tions were obtained by gathering information on
country-level political, regulatory, and economic
environments. We used the data from Holmes et al.
(2013) and the output of an exploratory factor anal-
ysis of the institutional variables that they com-
pleted (see Appendix A). The data were reduced to
20 variables, which loaded on four factors—politi-
cal democracy, regulatory control, capital availabil-
ity, and market liquidity—as noted in Appendix B.
Political democracy reflects the means through
which government officials and other individuals
enact changes in formal institutions. Regulatory in-
stitutions establish and enforce laws and policies
that govern business activities. Capital availability
influences the investment decisions of organiza-
because the purposes of creating databases and directo-
ries differ from organization to organization. For exam-
ple, local governments may set up databases for collect-
ing taxes and for policy purposes such as the promotion
of women’s or high-tech entrepreneurship. The special-
ized directories of women’s business associations (e.g.,
“Women entrepreneurs in Beijing’s Zhongguancun high-
tech district”) will list only those women entrepreneurs
who are active members of associations, clubs, and other
organizations. Databases of venture capital and consult-
ing companies (e.g., Zero2ipo) in China are likely to list
firms in certain industries (e.g., IT or nanotechnology) or
high-growth firms. In addition, many databases and di-
rectories contain information about those ventures regis-
tered in a particular location, and may not have informa-
tion for those ventures registered elsewhere but operating
mainly in that location. For example, when we collected
interview data in Beijing and Moscow, we realized that
there were many ventures that operated mainly in Beijing
and Moscow but were registered elsewhere. These ven-
tures were not listed on any of the local government-run
databases but came up in other directories. Therefore, the
use of various information sources is likely to counter-
balance systematic biases of different databases and di-
rectories and make the sample more random and bal-
anced. Third, World Bank researchers adopted a similar
approach by using multiple information sources and
found this approach to be valid (Djankov et al., 2006).
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tions and individuals by affecting both their access
to capital and its value. Market liquidity captures a
country’s liabilities, exchange rate, and liquidity.
To measure institutional weakness/inefficiency,
we reverse-coded the factors of political democ-
racy, capital availability, and market liquidity. The
regulatory control institutions variable stands in
contrast. Although some legal and regulatory pro-
tections are desirable for entrepreneurs, overly bu-
reaucratic rules and procedures can be onerous and
highly inefficient, especially for entrepreneurs. In
effect, such rules and policies greatly increase the
transaction costs and opportunity costs for entre-
preneurs. A higher institutional score reflects a
greater confluence of weak and inefficient formal
institutions. The latent variable institutions was
then created using these factors, where political
democracy (0.90), regulatory control (0.99), capital
availability (0.84), and market liquidity (0.89) load
positively in the PLS analysis.
We used this measurement for the following rea-
sons. First, the operationalization and measure-
ment are consistent with the concept of institu-
tional multiplicity. We examine one form of
institutional multiplicity: confluence of various
types of institutions (political, regulatory, and eco-
nomic). Second, this measurement enables us to
examine the effects of national-level formal institu-
tions on outcomes in a composite and cointegrated
manner. Therefore, the measurement is consistent
with theoretical arguments and this study’s goals.
We used the name generator method (Burt, 1992;
Marsden, 1990) to obtain data on entrepreneurs’
personal (egocentric) networks involving three con-
tents: business advice, business resources, and
emotional support. We employed the name gener-
ator method because it enables measuring struc-
tural properties of networks (i.e., density and struc-
tural holes) thoroughly while being less likely to
suffer from social desirability bias than other meth-
ods, including the position generator method. Each
respondent was asked to provide the first names or
the surnames of up to five individuals in his or her
network from whom he or she had obtained busi-
ness advice (e.g., information and suggestions),
business resources (e.g., finances, supplies), and
emotional support in the last six months.5 Each
contact was named only once. For each contact,
respondents also answered the question “How
close do you feel to this person” as “very close,”
“close,” “neither close not distant,” or “distant.”
Similarly, the respondent reported his/her percep-
tion of the relationship between two pairs of con-
tacts as “close,” “neither close nor distant,” or “dis-
tant.” “Distant” was defined as “two individuals
rarely work together, are strangers, or do not enjoy
each other’s company.” We used Burt’s (1992) mea-
sure of network constraint to capture structural
holes:
Ci (pijq1N piqpij)2, q i, j,
where pij is the proportion of total relational
strength that i directly allocates to j, piq is the pro-
portion of total relational strength that i devotes to
q, and pqj is the proportion of total relational
strength that contact j devotes to contact q. We used
UCINET 6 software to calculate the network con-
straint score. Structural holes is measured as 1 mi-
nus the network constraint score, with larger scores
denoting more structural holes. We asked a series
of additional questions about each contact in each
network (eliciting, e.g., how many years the respon-
dent had known the contact, the contact’s gender,
and the nature of the tie, such as “family”).
Dependent variable. We use revenue growth as
a proxy for venture performance because it is a
common measure of the success of new ventures
(Baum, Locke, & Smith, 2001) and is more appro-
priate than alternative measures in cross-country
and cross-industry comparative contexts (Brush &
Vanderwerf, 1992). In the interview, we asked for
revenue growth information for the four years prior
to the time of the telephone survey. Revenue
growth is the difference between sales in two con-
secutive years divided by sales one year earlier.
The variable revenue growth is the sum of revenue
growth percentages divided by the number of rev-
enue years.
Control variables. We control for firm age, mea-
sured as years since the date of founding, and firm
size, measured as the number of full-time employ-
ees. We control for demographic attributes and hu-
man capital of the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneur’s
age is measured in years, and entrepreneur’s edu-
5 To preserve the anonymity and confidentiality of
network contacts, we asked the Chinese respondents to
provide surnames of their contacts (e.g., Wang or Li), and
the American, French, and Russian respondents to pro-
vide first names (e.g., Peter, Helen, or Anne-Marie). Sur-
names are common but first names are unique in China,
whereas in Russia, France, and the United States, first
names are common but surnames are unique.
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cation is coded as 1 when the entrepreneur’s edu-
cation is less than an undergraduate degree, 2 when
the entrepreneur has an undergraduate degree, 3 for
a master’s degree, and 4 for a doctorate. We control
for entrepreneur’s gender using a dummy variable
(1  “woman”). Entrepreneur’s managerial experi-
ence is the number of years the entrepreneur
worked as a manager before starting the new ven-
ture. We control for network size, network density,
and composition (women and family ties) in order
to estimate the net effect of structural holes. Net-
work size is the sum of the number of contacts
named in the three networks. Network density mea-
sures the extent to which contacts (alters) are con-
nected to each other (Marsden, 1990). This variable
is calculated by dividing the total number of iden-
tified relationships between the alters by the total
possible number of ties, which for an undirected
graph is:

i1
N 
j1
N aij
NN 1 ,
where aij is 1 (indicating the existence of a close
relationship between i and j), 0.5 (indicating the
existence of neither close nor distant relationship),
or 0 (indicating the absence of relationship); and N
is the number of contacts (alters). The women ties
variable is measured as the percentage of women in
an entrepreneur’s network (Batjargal, Hitt, Webb,
Arregle, & Miller, 2009). The family ties variable is
measured as the percentage of kin in an entrepre-
neur’s network. Proxies for the industry environ-
ment, industry dynamism and munificence, were
measured using Keats and Hitt’s (1988) method.
First, each new venture was coded on industry
affiliation: trade, service, information technology
(IT)/software, biotechnology/pharmaceuticals, or
light manufacturing. Munificence is measured as
the growth in revenues in each of the above indus-
tries, that is, the regression slope coefficient of rev-
enues for the period 2000–04 (for five years in each
industry). Dynamism is measured as the variation
in revenues over this period in each industry—that
is, as the standard error of the regression slope
coefficient of revenues. This figure is then divided
by the industry mean in revenues to standardize
the values across industries. These two variables
were used as manifest variables of a latent variable
industry, reflecting industry environment. The data
sources used to gather revenue data for China, Rus-
sia, France, and the United States are listed in
Appendix C. Finally, we control for national cul-
ture because it affects formal institutions as well as
entrepreneurial activities (Holmes et al., 2013). To
measure culture in each country, we used data from
the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior
Effectiveness project (GLOBE) (House, Hanges,
Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). Specifically, we
used in-group collectivism, power distance, uncer-
tainty avoidance, and gender egalitarianism as cul-
tural practice variables. These four variables were
used as manifest variables of the latent control vari-
able culture. Higher scores mean greater collectiv-
ism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance,
and lower gender egalitarianism.
Data Validity
We conducted validation checks on our data. In
the US sample, validation was performed on a ran-
domly selected group of 34 entrepreneurs from the
sample. For this group, we readministered the sur-
vey three months, on average, following the initial
survey to determine the reliability of the entrepre-
neurs’ responses. We found the agreement between
the initial and follow-up data to be more than
80 percent for venture characteristics such as firm
size, firm age, and revenue growth. Follow-up
questions suggested that the few differences were
related to actual changes in the ventures (e.g., fur-
ther growth in revenue or personnel). In France, we
re-interviewed 11 of the sampled entrepreneurs
(10 percent of the French sample) an average
two months after the initial data collection. We
asked the same questions and found 95 percent
agreement on networks, venture characteristics,
and revenue across the interviews.
In China and Russia, we used a different proce-
dure to validate the data. By selecting every fifth or
sixth entrepreneur in our samples, we created lists
of 15 women-owned and 15 men-owned ventures
in each country. We submitted revenue growth data
of 30 Beijing-based firms to the Government Tax
Bureau in Beijing and 30 Russian firms to the Tax-
ation Department of the Moscow City Government
for the cities where these ventures operate. We
asked government officials to confirm whether our
data were consistent with their data. We received
confirmation that our revenue growth data for 27
Chinese firms (90%) and 24 Russian firms (80%)
were consistent with the data in the respective tax
offices. Social network data were validated through
interviews. We asked for the telephone number of
one of the contacts listed in the business resource
networks. We obtained telephone numbers for 18
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contacts in China and 12 contacts in Russia. We
telephoned these contacts and validated the entre-
preneurs’ responses. We asked the contacts for
their functional backgrounds and relational bases
(“How did you get to know this person?”). The
responses of 17 Chinese contacts (94%) and 10
Russian contacts (83%) were consistent with the
data we obtained in the survey from the entrepre-
neurs. According to James, Demaree, and Wolf
(1984), an agreement of at least 80 percent between
multiple raters is necessary to establish reliability.
The evidence from our validation procedures sug-
gests that the network and revenue growth data are
reliable in all four samples.
Analyses
Before hypothesis testing, we performed addi-
tional data quality checks. First, we examined the
data for outliers. Using scatterplots, casewise diag-
nostics, and Cook’s distance analysis (Cook, 1979),
we found three outliers in the relationship between
network size and revenue growth. These outliers
were excluded from further analyses. Second, some
entrepreneurs were reluctant to provide revenue
growth data, resulting in 21 percent of the sample
having missing data on the major dependent vari-
able. Following Little and Rubin’s (2002) guideline,
we used the mean revenue growth of each country
to substitute for missing data in that country. Anal-
yses using the sample both with and without the
mean substitution yielded similar results. We re-
ported the results using the sample with mean sub-
stitution to conserve sample size and maintain sta-
tistical power.6
We used PLS to analyze the data for hypothesis
testing because it calculates the confluence of mul-
tiple institutions by differentially weighting the
four institutional factors. As a modeling approach,
PLS has been used in management research fruit-
fully (Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009; Hulland,
1999). In contrast to covariance-based structural
equation modeling such as LISREL, PLS is a com-
ponent-based structural equation modeling ap-
proach (Esposito Vinzi, Chin, Henseler, & Wang,
2010). The main advantages of PLS are that it relies
on less stringent assumptions about the distribu-
tion of the variables and is able to estimate complex
models with many latent and manifest variables
such as our institutional and culture variables
(Chin, 2010; Hulland, 1999; Shamir, Zakay, & Pop-
per, 1998). The results of PLS analyses are evalu-
ated by considering the composite reliability, aver-
age extracted variance, value of R2, and bootstrap
for the t-values (Chin, 2010; Henseler et al., 2009;
Hulland, 1999). Therefore, we chose PLS con-
sidering the measures of institutions, culture, and
industry, and the relatively fewer variations in the
country-level variables. We used SmartPLS soft-
ware to carry out the analyses (Ringle, Wende, &
Will, 2005).
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and
Pearson’s correlations of all study variables. The
average firm size is 36 full-time employees (s.d. 
61.5). Twenty-five percent of the ventures were in
IT, software, and biotechnology industries; 46 per-
cent were in trade and services; and the remaining
29 percent were in other industries. The average
age of the entrepreneurs was 39 years (s.d.  8.5).
The mean network size was 5.7 contacts (s.d. 
2.5), and the mean structural holes score was 0.49
(s.d.  0.21). The finding on the mean network size
is consistent with the findings of previous surveys
of egocentric networks in the general population
(Marsden, 1990; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Bras-
hears, 2006) and of entrepreneurs (Aldrich, Reese,
& Dubini, 1989; Batjargal, 2007c). The average rev-
enue growth was 36 percent (s.d.  61).
Table 2 illustrates the convergent and discrimi-
nant validity analyses for the PLS models explain-
ing network’s structural holes and revenue growth
of new ventures. The results indicate that institu-
tions as an independent variable and industry and
culture as control variables present strong conver-
gent and discriminant validity.
Table 3 shows the results for the four hypotheses.
Models 1 and 2 examine the effects of the conflu-
ence of weak and inefficient institutions on a net-
work’s structural holes. Model 1 is the base model
for structural holes with control variables. Model 2
includes the effects of the confluence of formal
institutions and shows a statistically significant
positive effect on structural holes (b  0.15, p 
.05), providing support for Hypothesis 1.
Model 3 is the base model for revenue growth
with controls. Due to the high correlation between
network size and structural holes (r  .67, p 
.001), the former was excluded as a control in the
testing of Hypotheses 2 through 4. Model 4 in-
6 The results of the analyses without mean substitu-
tion are available upon request.
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TABLE 2
Convergent and Discriminant Validity Analyses for PLS Models Explaining Structural Holes and Revenue Growtha
Models Explaining
Structural Holes
Composite
Reliability
Models Explaining
Revenue Growth
Composite
Reliability
Culture .84 Culture .82
Industry .80 Industry .75
Institutions .70 Institutions .95
Variable Culture Industry Institutions Culture Industry Institutions
Culture .63 Culture .61
Industry .02 .68 Industry .28 .62
Institutions .40 .12 .52 Institutions .37 .49 .82
Firm age .01 .00 .00 Firm age .05 .01 .06
Firm size .00 .02 .00 Firm size .02 .03 .09
Entrepreneur’s age .01 .04 .04 Entrepreneur’s age .04 .06 .06
Entrepreneur’s education .00 .00 .00 Entrepreneur’s education .01 .00 .02
Entrepreneur’s managerial
experience
.06 .08 .08 Entrepreneur’s managerial
experience
.14 .14 .14
Entrepreneur’s genderb .00 .00 .00 Entrepreneur’s genderb .00 .00 .01
Network size .03 .00 .04 Network density .12 .05 .08
Women tiesc .00 .00 .00 Network structural holes .02 .00 .00
Family tiesc .00 .00 .01 Women tiesc .01 .01 .02
Network density .04 .03 .03 Family tiesc .01 .00 .04
a Values in bold show the average variance extracted (AVE) by constructs. The other values are the squared correlations (Chin, 2010).
b “Woman”  1.
c Expressed as percentages.
TABLE 3
Standardized Path (Regression) Coefficients from PLS Analysis Predicting Structural Holes and Revenue Growth
Variable
Structural Holes Revenue Growth
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Firm age .00 .00 .10** .09** .09** .09**
Firm size .04** .04* .00 .07** .04* .03
Entrepreneur’s age .01 .00 .14*** .17*** .18*** .17***
Entrepreneur’s education .02 .01 .02 .00 .00 .01
Entrepreneur’s managerial experience .03 .03 .06 .06 .06 .05
Network size .64*** .64***
Women tiesa .03 .03 .01 .02 .02 .02
Family tiesa .08* .07* .01 .02 .01 .00
Network density .47*** .47*** .01 .00 .04 .06†
Entrepreneur’s genderb .02 .02 .07† .04 .05* .05
Culturec .01 .14* .30*** .18*** .17*** .16***
Industryc .01 .02 .12* .00 .01 .00
Institutionsc (H1, H2) .15* .32*** .33*** .51***
Structural holes (H3) .10* .12**
Institutions  structural holes (H4) .18**
R2 .65 .68 .20 .24 .25 .27
Significance in R2 (p-value) .04 .00 .01 .00
a Expressed as percentages.
b “Woman”  1.
c Composite variables.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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cludes the effects of the confluence of weak insti-
tutions on revenue growth and shows a statistically
significant negative effect on revenue growth (b 
0.32, p  .001). Thus, Hypothesis 2 receives sup-
port. Model 5 reveals that the main effect of net-
work’s structural holes on revenue growth is posi-
tive and statistically significant (b  0.10, p  .05),
providing support for Hypothesis 3. Model 6 exam-
ines the two-way interaction effects of institutional
confluence and structural holes on revenue growth.
The results show that the interaction effect is pos-
itive and statistically significant (b 0.18, p .01),
providing support for Hypothesis 4.
Robustness Checks
We conducted several additional analyses to
check the robustness of the results. An important
concern in entrepreneurship research is sample se-
lection bias (Djankov, Qian, Roland, & Zhurav-
skaya, 2006). Therefore, we performed the Heck-
man (1979) two-stage estimation procedure to de-
termine if the effects of the independent and mod-
erator variables on revenue growth, as shown in
Table 3, are robust. In the first stage of this proce-
dure, the inverse Mills ratio () was calculated us-
ing the total sample of the surveyed firms and the
nonsurveyed firms. The nonsurveyed firms are the
ventures that meet our sampling criteria but did not
respond to our requests or that we were unable to
reach. We dummy-coded the surveyed firms as 1
and used this variable as the dependent variable in
a probit model.7 We used firm age, the trade/service
dummy, and interaction of firm age and the trade/
service dummy as the independent variables in the
probit model, because we had information on these
variables in both the surveyed firms and the non-
surveyed firms.8 Then, the inverse Mills ratio was
inserted into second-stage PLS regression models
in which the dependent variable is revenue growth
as a control variable. The inverse Mills ratio re-
moves any potential bias due to sample selection
and endogeneity (Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck, &
Shimizu, 2006). Following the Heckman proce-
dure, we excluded firm age and the trade/service
dummy in the second-stage model in estimating
new venture revenue growth. The results in Table 4
show that our findings are robust when we include
the inverse Mills ratio as a control.9 These findings
suggest that the original results are not subject to
sample selection bias.
According to Stuart and Sorenson (2007), the
cause-effect problem of networks versus venture
performance in entrepreneurship research is a po-
tential concern. Therefore, we conducted addi-
tional tests to ensure that the results do not suffer
from reverse causality. Using the collected informa-
tion on the duration of each respondent-alter (con-
tact named) tie, we estimated the average dyadic
ego-alter (ego is the respondent, and alter is the
7 Because of the lack of data on nonsurveyed firms in
France and the United States, the test was conducted
using those from Chinese (n  612) and Russian (n 
480) firms. Therefore, we calculated the inverse Mills
ratio using only the Chinese and Russian data. The non-
surveyed firm data from France and the United States are
incomplete and sketchy due to the minor differences in
the data collection procedures.
8 We have information on gender and firm location;
however, it would be inappropriate to use these two
variables to test sample selection bias, because we delib-
erately oversampled women, and women entrepreneurs
are distributed differently in various locations.
9 We have to use the total sample of 637 in the second
stage (Table 4), because the regression results of the sub-
sample of Chinese and Russian firms (n  377) would be
very different from the total sample due to the institu-
tions hypotheses.
TABLE 4
Standardized Path (Regression) Coefficients from PLS
Analysis Predicting Revenue Growth: Heckman’s
Two-Stage Estimation Procedurea
Variable Model 1
Firm size .00
Entrepreneur’s age .16***
Entrepreneur’s education .01
Entrepreneur’s managerial experience .06
Network density .05
Women tiesb .03
Family tiesb .02
Culturec .13***
Industryc .02
Entrepreneur’s genderd .06†
Inverse Mills ratio () .18**
Institutionsc .39**
Structural holes .16***
Institutions  structural holes .23**
a n  637.
b Expressed as percentages.
c Composite variables.
d “Woman”  1.
† p  .10
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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contact) tie age for each respondent—the sum of
years known for each alter divided by the number
of alters. The data showed that the sample mean of
dyadic tie age is 9.52 years for advice networks (s.d.
 7.12), 7.8 years (s.d. 6.00) for business resource
networks, 16.25 years (s.d.  10.08) for emotional
support networks, and 11.14 years (s.d.  5.69) for
the overall networks. In comparison, the mean firm
age is 4.5 years (s.d.  2.20) (Table 1). These data
indicate that the entrepreneurs knew most contacts
well (i.e., for 6.7 years on average) before they
started their ventures. Thus, the large time gap
between tie cultivation and venture creation en-
ables us to assume that networks influenced ven-
ture performance rather than venture performance
affected network structure and composition.
DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest that the confluence of mul-
tiple weak and inefficient institutions is associated
with larger numbers of structural holes in entrepre-
neurs’ social networks. Such an institutional order
also has a direct negative effect on new venture
growth. A network’s structural holes facilitate the
revenue growth of new venture firms. Further, the
confluence of weak and inefficient institutions en-
hances the effect of structural holes on new venture
success. Thus, the results of this study suggest that
the strength and efficiency of multiple formal insti-
tutions influence the effects of a network’s struc-
tural holes on new ventures’ revenue growth.
Structural holes operate as a substitute for weak
and inefficient rules and as a protection against
destructive multiple institutional forces. Under
these conditions, entrepreneurs benefit from their
network’s structural holes. However, those entre-
preneurs who operate in settings where the entire
institutional order is adverse and uncertain benefit
more from their networks’ structural holes. The
results offer new and nuanced insights into the role
of social networks for entrepreneurs operating in
polycentric, weak, and inefficient institutional
orders.
This research provides evidence of the contin-
gent nature of both formal institutions and social
networks for entrepreneurial success. In particular,
it suggests that the concept of multiplicity as a part
of institutional polycentrism plays an important
role in the value of entrepreneurs’ social networks
for achieving success. Furthermore, the entrepre-
neurial networks serve different functions in differ-
ent institutional orders. For example, we found that
the institutional multiplicity characterized as the
confluence of political, regulatory, and economic
institutions had strong influences on both the so-
cial networks employed by entrepreneurs and on
new venture growth. Additionally, when the com-
bination of weak and inefficient institutions creates
an adverse institutional order, lower-level informal
institutions and networks (e.g., personal networks)
become more important, suggesting the importance
of institutional multiplicity and substitution as
core concepts of the institutional polycentrism
theory.
This research extends researchers’ understand-
ing of institutional polycentrism, showing the joint
effects of the confluence of formal institutions (or
lack thereof) and informal networks. And impor-
tantly, the effects of polycentric institutions also
extend to entrepreneurial ventures. Finally, this
research extends understanding of social network
theory, suggesting that institutional rules influence
the use and outcomes of entrepreneurs’ social net-
works (Granovetter, 1995).
The theoretical framework developed and tested
is original and scientifically useful in a number of
ways. This is one of the first studies in management
and entrepreneurship to employ the concepts of
institutional multiplicity and institutional substi-
tution from the theory of institutional polycen-
trism. Therefore, the theoretical perspective ad-
vances knowledge of polycentric institutions and
polycentric institutional orders. Further, this study
is one of the first to theorize and empirically exam-
ine the interactive influence of multiple types of
formal institutions and personal networks on entre-
preneurial outcomes (Brass et al., 2004; Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2008), showing the influence of
multiple-type institutions and networks on firm
outcomes. Integrating two important research per-
spectives, namely, institutional polycentrism the-
ory and social network theory, enhances under-
standing of the contingencies and contexts in
which firms and entrepreneurs must operate. As a
whole, the theoretical framework opens new direc-
tions in institution-based and network-based
research.
The national institutional orders in China and
Russia remain highly inefficient and weak, result-
ing in negative synergies, conflicts and contradic-
tions, and deterioration (Batjargal, 2010a; Nee,
2005; Shleifer, 2005; Xu, 2011). Hence, guanxi
(connections) networks in China (Chen, Chen &
Huang, 2013; Luo, Huang & Wang, 2012) and svyazi
(connections) networks in Russia serve as func-
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tional substitutes for formal institutions and as a
protection against dysfunctional institutions
(Djankov et al., 2006). This study confirms the im-
portance of the structure of these two types of net-
works, respectively. Our study further confirms
that even in strong institutional settings (such as
the United States and France), networks’ structural
holes still offer the potential for positive returns to
entrepreneurs.
This study focused on three types of formal in-
stitutions at one level. Future research should ex-
amine functional (what it does), process (how it
performs and evolves), and normative (how it
should be) aspects of multisource, multicode, mul-
tilevel, multitype, multisector, and multifunctional
rules and norms. In particular, investigation of the
relationships of multiple rules at the national ver-
sus local level, regulatory versus informal rules,
and the different structures and compositions of
networks is a promising direction for future
research.
The institutional configuration processes (e.g.,
rule complementarity) should also be examined.
Because polycentric institutions are dynamic, the
centers of power and authority can change over
time. Therefore, the causes and consequences of
changing polycentric rules should be studied (Os-
trom & Basurto, 2011). Moreover, context-specific
rules and norms should be identified and analyzed
(Ostrom, 1990).
The current study focuses on institutions at the
national level. Some may argue that local institu-
tions may have a greater influence on entrepreneur-
ship than national ones. However, local rules and
prescriptions nested and embedded in national
rules and norms can be complementary to higher-
level formal institutional arrangements (Os-
trom, 2005a).
Further, polycentric institutional arrangements
enable local actors to design unique problem-solv-
ing rules and avoid being caught between a false
dilemma of “the state” and “the market” (Ostrom,
2010; Ostrom & Walker, 2000). On the other hand,
highly decentralized and overlapping rules may
cause confusion, spread resources thinly, and trig-
ger conflicts among competing institutional actors
such as national versus local bureaucracies (Green,
2007; Ostrom, 1999a). It is possible that polycentric
institutions have inverse U-shaped effects on cer-
tain outcomes as a result of both the advantages and
disadvantages that polycentric prescriptions
generate.
The development and validation of comprehen-
sive empirical measures of institutional polycen-
trism are crucial for understanding of polycentric
governance. Further, the differences and similari-
ties between well-established concepts such as in-
stitutional complexity and institutional pluralism
on the one hand, and institutional polycentrism on
the other hand, require further investigation. Vari-
ous types of polycentrism such as political, legal,
market, regional, cultural, and network polycen-
trism should be examined and used to frame re-
search questions (Green, 2007; Ostrom, 1999b).
At a broad level, our research indicates that in-
stitutional polycentrism influences how entrepre-
neurs network to support their growth objectives.
This research also complements the extant research
suggesting that institutional polycentrism influ-
ences the domain of activity pursued by entrepre-
neurs, and more specifically, whether and how in-
dividuals pursue entrepreneurship in the formal
versus informal economy. While the formal econ-
omy encompasses activities that are considered le-
gal and legitimate, the informal economy includes
those entrepreneurial activities that are illegal yet
remain legitimate (Webb et al., 2009). As an exam-
ple of informal economy activities, entrepreneurs
can produce legal goods and services while skirting
trademark laws, tax regulations, labor laws, or
other formal institutional prescriptions. Various in-
stitutional centers each prescribe rules that govern
economic activity, and entrepreneurs can leverage
strategies to respond to the challenges and incen-
tives imposed by those rules. As the jurisdictions of
multiple institutional centers overlap, each center
can impose prescriptions that are aligned with its
own specific objectives but that conflict with those
objectives and, therefore, prescriptions of other in-
stitutional centers (Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi, & Ire-
land, 2013). Conflict across institutional centers
creates ambiguities at the institutional level as to
what defines legitimate behaviors and outcomes
(Fernandez-Kelly, 2006), thereby undermining en-
forcement and surfacing opportunities in the infor-
mal economy for entrepreneurs to exploit. While
our findings suggest that some entrepreneurs can
exploit network strategies to substitute for a con-
fluence of weak institutions in growing their ven-
tures, extant research also suggests that in other
cases entrepreneurs may view the confluence of
weak institutions as conferring minimal benefits
for operating in the formal economy, motivating
and enabling them to pursue opportunities in the
informal economy instead.
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We included three types of networks in our
study: networks for business resources, advice, and
emotional support. Post hoc analysis shows a
slightly larger number of ties in the advice net-
works (mean  2.21) relative to the business re-
source networks (mean  1.74) and emotional sup-
port networks (mean  1.84). Further analysis
shows that both advice networks and emotional
support networks positively relate to revenue
growth (r  .18, p  .01 and r  .12, p  .01,
respectively), but interestingly, business resource
networks are not related to growth. Perhaps mem-
bers of advice networks provide strategic informa-
tion that is important for the development of the
venture while resources networks do not offer a
competitive advantage (perhaps the resources pro-
vided are necessary for competitive parity). Access
to and obtaining resources may be necessary for
gaining legitimacy and survival by new ventures.
Future research should systematically test the ef-
fects of these different networks as well as explore
other types of networks (e.g., mentor, political aid,
or international networks) and the relational base
of these networks (e.g., education, profession, or
family) as possible factors associated with network
returns. Recently, scholars have suggested that the
content and process of social exchange may vary
across cultures (Luo, 2011; Shore, Coyle-Shapiro,
Chen, & Tetrick, 2009). For example, the role of
social networks may differ in Confucian cultures
(Chai & Rhee, 2010). In this study, the latent culture
variable has a negative effect on the revenue growth
of the new ventures. Unpacking the effect of culture
and the exchange process within social networks in
different cultures would contribute to further the-
oretical refinements in network research as well as
provide additional understanding of how entrepre-
neurs build, maintain, and derive benefits from
their networks.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, we re-
lied on slightly different methods to obtain the
samples and to verify the data quality in the four
countries. While these small differences were dic-
tated by the contexts in which the data were col-
lected, they might introduce some error variance.
However, if such error exists, we found no evi-
dence of systematic effects on the results. Second,
the sample may be composed of ventures that sur-
vived; however, the potential for bias in this study
is not severe for the following reasons: The research
objective was to compare the financial performance
of new ventures rather than examine venture sur-
vival. Previous research indicates that financial
performance does not predict survival of new firms
in all contexts because some financially sound ven-
tures are discontinued while other financially dis-
tressed ventures survive longer. This conclusion is
particularly applicable to firms in emerging econo-
mies (Lyles, Saxton, & Watson, 2004). In addition,
we control for firm age, which has a negative effect
on revenue growth (Table 3, models 3–6). We
checked firm age distribution, and found that it is
not skewed toward older firms. This outcome indi-
rectly indicates that the sample does not suffer
from survivor bias. Third, we compared new ven-
tures in terms of revenue growth, which is not the
only indicator for entrepreneurial success. Use of
other performance indicators, such as employment
growth or product development, might produce
different outcomes.
Conclusion
By extending the newly emerging literature on
institutional polycentrism, this study contributes
to institutional theory, comparative entrepreneur-
ship research, and social network theory. Of partic-
ular importance are the contributions to knowledge
of entrepreneurship in polycentric institutional or-
ders. To the extent that new venture creation and
development is important to the economic devel-
opment in countries globally, the present study
provides a contribution to both theory and practice
in the field of entrepreneurship. Social networks,
as sources of business resources, advice, and emo-
tional support, are especially important when the
confluence of multiple weak and inefficient insti-
tutions creates an adverse institutional order for
entrepreneurs. This work is interdisciplinary and
has important implications for research on the ef-
fects of polycentric institutions, and on the effects
of networks vis-à-vis the success of new ventures.
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APPENDIX A
Institutional Variables by Data Sourcea
Freedom House: Civil liberties index, political rights
International Country Risk Guide: Corruption.
Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney, Lawson, &
Block, 1996): Contract and property rights, fiscal burden,
foreign investment restrictions, government control over
wages and prices, government intervention in banking,
government restrictions on industry, informal market,
monetary policy, regulatory burden, trade policy.
POLCON: Executive political restrictions, political
constraints.
Political Risk Services: Government budget balance, cap-
ital investment, change in real wages, credit transfers,
exchange rate, debt service cost, industry workforce, in-
flation rate, liabilities, liquidity, money supply, net re-
serves, nominal GDP, size of population, services work-
force, trade balance, total foreign debt, unemployment
rate, unionized workforce.
World Bank’s World Development Indicators: Value of
stocks traded.
APPENDIX B
Institutional Measurements: Results of
Factor Analysisa
Factor Item
Factor
Loading
Political democracy Political constraints 0.96
Political rights 0.87
Civil liberties 0.76
Executive political restrictions 0.68
Regulatory control Regulatory burden 0.80
Contract and property rights 0.79
Trade policy 0.77
Informal markets 0.77
Government intervention in
banking
0.77
Foreign investment
restrictions
0.75
Monetary policy 0.58
Capital availability Money supply 0.96
Capital investments 0.94
Total foreign debt 0.93
Nominal GDP 0.89
Budget balance 0.73
Net reserves 0.71
Market liquidity Liabilities 0.78
Liquidity 0.72
Exchange rate 0.64
Total proportion of variance
explained
70.8
a Please see Holmes et al. (2013) for a complete exploratory
factor analysis with all factor loadings.
APPENDIX C
Industry Sales Data Sources
Chinese Industry Data
(1) The sales data for retail trade, wholesale trade, ser-
vice, the IT industry, biotechnology, and light manufac-
turing for 2000–04 were collected from the following
sources: the China Statistical Yearbook (1999–2004);
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Tongji Ju (National
a Please see Holmes et al. (2013) for more information on
institutional variables, their transformations, and definitions.
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Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China).
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata.
Accessed April 20, 2010.
(2) The sales data for the software industry for 2000–04
were collected from the following sources: Software and
Information Service Industries are Beijing’s Advanta-
geous Industries, Beijingshi Kexue Jishu Weiyuanhui
(Beijing Municipal Science & Technology Commission).
http://www.bjkw.gov.cn/htm/ztrd_zxgz/zxgz090508/nig
uangnan2.html. Accessed May 5, 2010.
Russian Industry Data
(1) The sales data for retail and wholesale trade for
2000–04 were collected from the following sources: Tor-
govlya v Rossii [Trade in Russia], 2005(1): 1–11; Vorposy
Statistiki [Problems of Statistics], 2006(3): 66–77;
2006(5): 87–93; 2006(6): 72–83; 2006(10): 82–83;
2007(1): 83–94; 2007(3): 82–93; 2007(10): 60–71;
Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki [Fed-
eral State Statistics Service, Russian Federation].
(2) The sales data for the service industry for 2000–04
were collected from the following sources: Statistiches-
koe Obozrenie [Current Statistical Survey], 2000(1);
2001(1); 2002(1): 43–45; 2003(1); 2004(1): 64–66;
2005(1): 64–66; Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi
Statistiki.
(3) The sales data for the IT and software industries for
2000–04 were collected from the following sources:
Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik [Russian Statistical
Annuals], 2004(1): 555–560; 2005(1); Russia in Figures,
2002(1): 269–285; 2003(1): 267–283; Federal’naya
Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki.
(4) The sales data for the biotech industry for 2000–04
were collected from the following sources: Promyshlen-
nost’ v Rossii [Industries in Russia], 2005(1); Russia in
Figures, 2001(1); Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi
Statistiki.
(5) The sales data for the light manufacturing industry
were collected from the following sources: Statistiches-
koe Obozrenie, 2002(1): 23–33; 2003(1); 2004(1): 39–50;
2005(1): 39–50; 2005(4); Federal’naya Sluzhba Gosu-
darstvennoi Statistiki.
French Industry Data
The sales data were collected from the Eurostat online
database on European industries. http://epp.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database.
Accessed January 5, 2010.
US Industry Data
Industry sales data for the United States were gathered
from Compustat North America. http://www.compustat.
com. Accessed June 1, 2010.
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